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Amok: Framing Discourses on Political Violence by Means of Symbolic Logic

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After the then 32-year-old Anders Behring Breivik placed a car bomb outside the office of Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, he proceeded to the nearby island of Utøya armed with a hunting rifle and a pistol. There, over the course of an hour in the early evening of 22 July 2011, he shot at the mainly young participants at a summer camp of the ruling Labour Party. Shortly beforehand, he had sent an English-language manifesto with the title “2083: A European Declaration of Independence” to roughly a thousand email addresses. In the 1,500-page screed, which Breivik had patched together from various ideologies and in parts simply copied from the internet, he sets out the abstruse motives for his attack and disseminates a world-view that is every bit as self-contradictory as it is radical.¹

On 16 April 2012 Breivik’s trial began before the district court in Oslo. He was charged with terrorism and multiple counts of premeditated murder. From the very outset, the question of Breivik’s criminal liability was at issue. While forensic psychiatric assessments came to different conclusions about Breivik’s mental condition,² the prosecutor pleaded for criminal insanity and called for the committal of the assassin to a secure psychiatric hospital. By contrast, the defence sought a finding of sanity for their client. Breivik saw himself as a “political activist” and wanted to be treated as such before the court. He repeatedly denied being insane, which he described as “a fate worse than death”.³

At the start of the trial, Breivik confessed to having killed 77 people, but declared himself not guilty and appealed to “emergency law”.⁴ He argued that he, as a “Knight Templar” and “liberator of mankind”, had to defend Europe against Islamic infiltration and Norway against

“multiculturalism” and “the cultural Marxism” of the social democratic government of Jens Stoltenberg.⁵ Counter to the request of the public prosecutor’s office, Breivik was ultimately declared not criminally insane on 24 August 2012, and sentenced to 21 years in prison and subsequent preventive detention for the murder of 77 people. The verdict was unanimous. Breivik filed no appeal, but rejected the authority of the court. All of this – the course of events of the crime, the contents of Breivik’s pamphlet, the progress of the trial – was reported to the public in Western media over weeks and months. Breivik’s terrifying act was unanimously condemned, and Breivik himself judged to be either a terrorist and a confused political extremist or a pathological violent criminal and insane “amok-runner”.⁶

1. Proto-definitions

However, let us begin not with the amok-runner but with the terrorist, or rather with the concept of the terrorist, from which – as will be shown – the concept of the amok-runner can also be derived.⁷ Especially since 9/11, “terrorist” is not only a loaded term in politics and the media but also one that is used at will by anyone against virtually anyone, as soon as he or she becomes violently politically active. Particularly in the context of hegemonic discourses as they have been conducted time and again since 9/11, seizing discursive authority seems sufficient in order to deem someone a terrorist. Reasons appear to be irrelevant, definitions obsolete: a terrorist is a terrorist merely because he or she has been referred to as such.

If, however, one wants to move beyond the level of tautological statements that would define a terrorist solely on the basis that he or she is a terrorist, thus in the form $T(x) \leftrightarrow T(x)$,⁸ then the terrorist must be defined by a characteristic that is precisely not that of being a terrorist. An approach here is offered by the term itself: with respect to its etymological origins, the term “terrorist” is derived from the Latin “*terere*” (to terrify).⁹ We take this as an opportunity to define “terrorist” as “terrifier”, albeit in a (grammatically) transitive sense as the terrifier of someone. Thus it becomes possible to make the term relational and to define it as a binary predicate, formally as $T(x) \leftrightarrow E(y,x)$: “*x* is a terrorist if and only if *y* feels terrified by *x*”. We expressly do not distinguish here between feeling and being: both “feeling terrified” and “being terrified” are understood as synonymous.¹⁰ In the relational determination “*y* feels terrified by *x*” or “*y* is terrified by *x*”, $E(y,x)$, *x* expresses the quantity of terrifiers and *y* the quantity of those terrified, the latter referring

to either the world or a regional population. Analogously, a freedom fighter can be identified as the liberator of someone and accordingly defined as $F(x) \leftrightarrow B(y,x)$: x is thus only a freedom fighter if y is or feels liberated by x . In the relational determination “ y is liberated by x ”, $B(y,x)$, x now expresses the quantity of liberators and y the quantity of those liberated, the latter again referring either to the world or to a regional population.

However, the above still does not provide an adequate definition of “terrorist” and “freedom fighter”. “To terrify” and “to liberate” are both, in the context of a discourse on terrorists or freedom fighters, tied to acts of violence – more accurately, to acts of politically motivated violence. Therefore, the use of force should also be formally considered so that both predicates are distinguished as ternary predicates.¹¹ As such, “ y is terrified of x by means of z ” applies for the terrifier relation, and, accordingly, “ y is liberated by x by means of z ” applies for the freedom-fighter relation. This in turn results in the following statement forms: for the terrorist, $T(x,z) \leftrightarrow E(y,x,z)$ – i.e., “ x is a terrorist and z is an attack if and only if y feels terrified by x by means of z ” – and for the freedom fighter, $F(x,z) \leftrightarrow B(y,x,z)$ – i.e., “ x is a freedom fighter and z is a liberating blow if and only if y feels liberated by x by means of z .”

If we apply these definitions to specific cases, we obtain statements whose truth is verifiable. For example: the attempted bombing assassination of Adolf Hitler by Claus Schenk, Graf von Stauffenberg on 20 July 1944 sets the variables x and z such that Stauffenberg is the committer of the violence and the bombing is the act of violence. With that alone, however, it has not yet been determined whether Stauffenberg is a terrorist or a freedom fighter. Stauffenberg becomes a terrorist or freedom fighter only when y is also determined. If y feels terrified, then Stauffenberg is a terrorist; if y feels liberated by his act, then Stauffenberg is a freedom fighter. But who or what is this y ? Obviously, it is no single individual, or else Stauffenberg would be alternatively a terrorist or a freedom fighter depending on whom one asks. Thus, it seems only sensible not to ask specific individuals or specific groups of individuals but rather all individuals, or at least all individuals affected.¹²

To be sure, it seems at first contradictory to intuitive legal or moral sensibilities to claim that the committers of violence and the acts of violence are not in themselves terroristic, but that they only become so if one understands them in the context of a terrifier relation or liberator relation. However, the whole premise becomes plausible once one places the circumstance against the specific background of resistance during World War II: today, Stauffenberg’s attempt to assassinate Hitler

in July 1944 is naturally *not* deemed an act of terrorism, but is seen as rather a liberating blow. Whether it also qualified as a liberating blow in Germany in 1944, however, is in question, as the reference group of evaluators today is a completely different one from in 1944. The deciding factor, therefore, is the evaluation of the act and the committer of the act, not the act itself: even if Stauffenberg's bomb had been better placed or contained a greater explosive force and had killed Hitler as planned, the violent act would still be regarded today as a liberating blow and Stauffenberg as a liberator or freedom fighter.

Based on the group of people affected by the violence, one can now generally determine who is a freedom fighter by means of quantification: a freedom fighter is one whose act of political violence causes the majority to feel liberated. Conversely, a terrorist is defined by the fact that the majority is terrified by his or her violence: to be a terrorist or a freedom fighter, then, means no more and no less than to be deemed by the majority to be a "terrifier" or a "liberator". The "legal concept" thus becomes a relative one and the decision-making process a democratic one. We move from a definition established by the authority of individuals to one decided on by the (democratic) majority.

By then quantifying those terrified and liberated from the group of evaluators with regard to majorities, the following formal definitions of politically motivated violence and those who commit it emerge:

$$1 \quad F(x,z) \leftrightarrow \mathbf{W}(y) B(y,x,z)^{13/14}$$

Someone carries out a liberating blow as a freedom fighter =_{df}
The majority feels liberated by the committer/act of violence.

$$2 \quad T(x,z) \leftrightarrow \mathbf{W}(y) E(y,x,z)$$

Someone commits an attack as a terrorist =_{df}
The majority feels terrified by the committer/act of violence.

Against the background that the majority includes "all" as a special case,¹⁵ one can additionally derive the definition of a hero and an amok-runner: while the number of those liberated is nearly everybody in the case of a hero, the number of those terrified is nearly everybody in the case of someone running amok. Almost all the evaluators feel terrified by the rampage or liberated by the heroic deed:¹⁶

$$3 \quad H(x,z) \leftrightarrow \forall(y) B(y,x,z)^{17}$$

Someone commits a heroic act as a hero =_{df}
Almost everyone feels liberated by the committer/act of violence.

4 $A(x,z) \leftrightarrow \forall(y) E(y,x,z)$ ¹⁸

Someone goes on a rampage as an amok-runner =_{df}

Almost everyone feels terrified by the committer/act of violence.

A historical example of a freedom fighter is given in a textbook from the German Democratic Republic. In reference to events in Havana on 8 January 1959, this states: “The people received their liberators with indescribable enthusiasm.”¹⁹ Indeed, Fidel Castro and the approximately 1,500 rebels with whom he reached the Cuban capital can be regarded on this day and in regard to the Cuban people as freedom fighters and their acts of violence as acts of liberation. That Castro and his revolution would, no doubt, be judged differently by a different reference group or at another time does not change this fact.

If things were as described in a *Spiegel* headline of 29 May 2009, which refers to Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as “The man the world fears”, then one would actually have in Ahmadinejad a candidate for the definition of a globally perceived amok-runner. However, the headline ultimately says more about how the press and mass media in general function than about the status of Ahmadinejad. As such, journalistic media do not just simply present events as accurately as possible. Rather, the media also construct media events by means of the rhetoric of images and text. In this case, we are dealing with a non-actual mode of expression based on the trope of a generalising synecdoche and a hyperbole. It is precisely not “the world” – i.e., the sum total of all human beings – that is terrified or afraid, but rather, if anything, the majority of people: the text rhetorically generalises and exaggerates. In fact, it seems here to be a matter of merely a terrorist, whose current and future acts of violence are feared by the world.

Only if Ahmadinejad had actually also used the atomic bomb, as is implied, among other things, by the *Spiegel*, would this satisfy our definition of a rampage and our definition of an amok-runner who terrifies (almost) everyone, hence “the world”, with his violent actions. What is merely ascribed to Ahmadinejad, Anders Breivik can lay genuine claim to for himself. Breivik’s attack can be regarded as a rampage and Breivik himself as an amok-runner for the very reason that his murder of 77 mostly young adults terrified the entire world, or at least the entire Western world.

Despite the examples given above for amok-runners, terrorists and freedom fighters (the hero has yet to be discussed), we are not dealing thus far with complete definitions, but rather only with

proto-definitions, insofar as the relationship between “to terrify” and “to liberate” has yet to be determined. Only in the following will this relationship be formulated in the context of three modellings: contradictory modelling, contrary modelling and contingency modelling.

2. Contradictory Modelling

In addition to the possibility of feeling liberated or terrified, the situation can arise of someone reporting neither feeling, or reporting both feelings at the same time. However, in these cases – and exactly that is the basis of the first modelling – the evaluator will be regarded as *undecided*. The following considerations are therefore based exclusively on either/or choices. Leaving the group of undecideds out of consideration can be justified by drawing an analogy to a voting decision. In an election I can also not decide to vote – i.e., I can abstain – or alternatively spoil my ballot paper by voting for all the candidates at the same time and, in so doing, likewise not decide. Thus, the others ultimately decide for me, and the result of the election is determined exclusively by the deciders.

With the exclusion of the group of undecided or non-deciders, the relationship of feeling terrified and feeling liberated is contradictory, so that in the following, the attributes “feeling liberated” and “not feeling terrified” and, by association, “feeling terrified” and “not feeling liberated” are treated as semantically synonymous and formal-logically equivalent. Formally, $\forall(y) [B(y,x,z) \leftrightarrow \neg E(y,x,z)]$ as well as $\forall(y) [E(y,x,z) \leftrightarrow \neg B(y,x,z)]$ apply.²⁰ On the basis of contradiction, then, terrifiers can be defined qua negation as liberators and liberators qua negation as terrifiers. For the terrorist, then, in addition to the above definition (2), the following also applies:

$$2' \quad T(x,z) \leftrightarrow W(y) \neg B(y,x,z)$$

Someone commits an attack as a terrorist =_{df}

The majority do *not* feel *liberated* by the violent act/perpetrator.

An example of this is a speech that Helmut Schmidt directed at the Red Army Faction on 8 September 1977. Among other things, he said: “You regard yourselves to be a small, chosen elite, destined, so you write, to liberate [*sic*] the masses. You are mistaken. The masses are against you.”²¹ If “the masses” is understood as the majority of the population of the Federal Republic of Germany, then the assessment (which forms

the basis of Schmidt's speech) of the violent acts of the Red Army Faction as attacks and of their perpetrators as terrorists was perfectly true, even if the Red Army Faction members wanted to see themselves as freedom fighters.

Also, the fact that Western media refer to Anders Breivik variously as a terrorist and as an amok-runner does not run contrary to our determination of Breivik, insofar as an amok-runner is always, *per definitionem*, a terrorist: the terrifying of everybody always implies the terrifying of the majority. However, what is gained with the definition of the amok-runner is the following: counter to the usual discourses, amok-runners can now be described completely independently of motives, triggers and predispositions. In order to identify such cases, namely those of political amok-runners, it is no longer necessary to diagnose insanity or a prehistory and disposition that have caused their acts of madness.²² All (remote) diagnoses by professionals and populist media can certainly have, ideally, an aetiological function for the purpose of preventing future killing sprees; nevertheless, aetiology is irrelevant for the identification of the amok-runner as such. The violence of the amok-runner is "crazy" because and only because of the fact that it terrifies (almost) everyone.

Usually, however, it is assumed, at least implicitly if not explicitly, that being an amok-runner and being a terrorist are mutually exclusive, and thus that the relationship is at least a contrary one: a political motivation is not ascribed to amok-runners, since they are insane, whereas a political motivation and thus, implicitly, not insanity is ascribed to terrorists. Precisely this was the explicit issue at Breivik's trial. Different assessments were given of Breivik's mental condition, which varyingly attested to his responsibility or diminished capacity, ergo insanity. The latter finding would have had the consequence that he could not have been charged – especially in the legal sense – with an act of terrorism and thus with a politically motivated act of violence.

This ultimately explains why Breivik himself insisted on being classified as legally sane: he needed to be considered sane in order to be regarded as the political assassin that he also held himself to be. However, according to the quantitative determination of a terrorist as amok-runner, precisely this differentiation is irrelevant. Breivik can as such be seen as both terrorist and amok-runner: that is to say, as an amok-runner and simultaneously also as a terrorist, who is mad because he terrifies nearly everybody with his politically motivated act. Conversely, the public prosecutor's office had to plead to the very end for Breivik's legal insanity (in the context of the conventional definition),

in order to deny his violent acts any political status. The impulse was to regard this mad action not as a political one and, therefore, it had to be considered insane, or regarded as something else – i.e., something neither insane nor political – which apparently was also not a desirable option. One could not, however, view Breivik’s action as political and insane at the same time.²³

This becomes possible only with the new definition of the amok-runner as an almost limitless terrifier. Breivik is now insane simply by virtue of the fact that his act terrified almost everyone, and not only, say, because he regards his actions, contradictorily, as terrifying and liberating at the same time. This contradiction is in any case only the result of a contradictory or contrary modelling of “to terrify” and “to liberate”: a contradictory or contrary relation between “to terrify” and “to liberate” is precisely the precondition for such a contradiction. Therefore, it will be shown that with contingency modelling this very condition is rendered invalid.

If one again considers the political amok-runner defined here in comparison with a political hero, yet another phenomenon arises: in actual fact, and in contrast to amok-runners, terrorists and freedom fighters, no real examples can be found for politically motivated heroes. Politically motivated heroes and heroic deeds seem to exist only in the form of fictionalising narratives. This phenomenon can be described, however, only on the basis of a contrary modelling.

3. Contrary Modelling

The contrariety between “to terrify” and “to liberate” means that one can now also choose to feel neither terrified nor liberated. At the same time, one still cannot feel simultaneously liberated and terrified. Formally, the following applies: $\forall(y) [B(y,x,z) \rightarrow \neg E(y,x,z)]$ and $\forall(y) [E(y,x,z) \rightarrow \neg B(y,x,z)]$.²⁴ With this, we have for the first time a concept of the freedom fighter as one who must be not only a non-terrifier but also a liberator: while the characteristic of being terrifying continues to be sufficient to define a terrorist, the quality of being non-terrifying is not sufficient to define a freedom fighter. For while “to terrify” continues to imply “to not liberate”, “to not terrify” now (unlike under contradictory modelling) no longer implies “to liberate”. Conversely, although “to liberate” still implies “to not terrify”, “to not liberate” no longer implies “to terrify”. The synonymy that exists within the framework of contradictory modelling is thus nullified, so that we achieve a more nuanced concept of the liberator in relation to the terrifier and vice versa.

If one describes the contrariety between “to terrify” and “to liberate” again by means of the voting analogy, this would entail that those who decide in a contradictory manner for all-of-the-above candidates, in this case “liberator” and “terrifier”, continue to be discounted (as void). However, those who remain undecided, who feel thus neither terrified nor unterrified, are counted now as non-voters. This has the consequence that a majority of undecideds can also form, and conversely – as was the case under contradictory modelling – a majority of terrified or liberated need not materialise; thus it follows from the contradictory modelling that every act of violence must necessarily be classified as an act of terrorism/rampage or a liberating blow/heroic deed, while in the context of a contrary relationship the status of the committer of violence can remain open. As such, contrary modelling of “to liberate” and “to terrify” ultimately makes possible a sort of scepticism,²⁵ not in the sense of being undecided between “terrified” and “not terrified” or “liberated” and “not liberated”, but as a decision against a compelled definition of oneself either as “liberated” or as “terrified”.²⁶

It may not, in the context of an election, sound very plausible to factor in non-deciders and thus non-voters, precisely because this could entail the idea that even all the parties put together might not attain a majority, since this would actually be held by the undecideds. However, in the discourse around decisions relating to politically motivated violence and those who commit it, majorities comprised of undecideds indeed make sense. When one bears in mind what consequences are entailed by declaring someone to be a terrorist, the argument in favour of contrary modelling and against contradictory modelling is clear: under contradictory modelling, if one cannot or does not want to classify someone as a liberator, then one has to automatically classify him or her as a terrorist. Yet the decision to classify someone as a terrorist or amok-runner has far-reaching implications for action – prosecution, retaliation, violence, war and death – further-reaching implications, in any event, than the decision to classify someone as a freedom fighter or hero.

However, if one again considers the difference between heroes and amok-runners on the basis of the concept of the freedom fighter as differentiated from the concept of the terrifier, the following becomes apparent: a heroic act that liberates almost everyone differs from a rampage that terrifies almost everyone in that the latter represents an “instantaneously possible event”: i.e., one that can occur virtually immediately. This is due to the fact that amok-runners do not change the world, but rather simply terrify almost everyone. However, in the

case of the hero, the situation is different. Because the number of those liberated by the heroic act is nearly everybody, we are dealing here with a “revolutionary event” in a broader sense and a “meta-event” in a stricter sense in the spirit of Jurij Lotman’s structural text analysis.²⁷ This means that in the course of the meta-event initiated by the hero, the world represented in a text is restructured: “boundaries are shifted, are reconstituted, and new, different orders are established.”²⁸

It is precisely this, however, that banishes the concept of the hero to the fictional realm. However often it may appear in fictional texts, the meta-event of a heroic deed is, in the reality of its time, improbable: as a rule, acts of violence do not change the world from one moment to the next and by unanimous consensus. A consensus must first be narratively produced and made possible historically: “heroic history” is written only in retrospect, and heroes almost never exist in actuality, but rather primarily in the fictional texts of propaganda and political utopia, for the very reason that their stories claim correspondence to a nearly impossible event. If, on the other hand, heroic deeds are to exist in reality, these must be preceded by a very special structure of the world and society, a structure that allows (almost) everybody to experience the violent act of the hero immediately as a liberation. This, in turn, can only happen, if (almost) everybody has regarded themselves previously as unfree.

Thus, when Breivik justifies his killing spree by claiming, among other things, to be the “liberator of mankind”, he may be a hero in his own eyes. However, this has little to do with reality, precisely because not (nearly) everyone regarded themselves as unfree, at least not in Norway, the Western world and probably also not in the rest of the world. Thus, Breivik is apparently living completely in his own world and for this very reason was deemed – completely correctly – insane.²⁹ Breivik can, though, also be deemed insane because he sees himself not only as a liberator but also as a terrifier, for example when he realistically observes: “I know that it was cruel, that I have inflicted indescribable grief.”³⁰ Here he produces an obvious contradiction that, if you will, again verifies his insanity. However, this contradiction is valid only in the context of a contrary and contradictory relation between “to terrify” and “to liberate”.

4. Contingency Modelling

In the framework of a contingency modelling, it is quite possible for “terrifying” and “liberating” to exist simultaneously: in addition to the

possibility of feeling liberated or terrified and the state of feeling neither, now the state can arise of someone feeling both at the same time. Despite the contingent relation between “to liberate” and “to terrify”, the concepts of liberating and terrifying themselves will not become random or arbitrary, as is sometimes implied by the use of the term “contingency” in cultural studies. On the contrary, it will continue to be impossible for one to be simultaneously liberated and not liberated or terrified and not terrified. Formally, the following applies: $\forall(y) \neg[B(y,x,z) \wedge \neg B(y,x,z)]$ and $\forall(y) \neg[E(y,x,z) \wedge \neg E(y,x,z)]$, which, in turn, results from the law of non-contradiction, the basic axiom of bivalent logic, generally expressed as $\neg(p \wedge \neg p)$: “p and not-p simultaneously are not true.”

In the context of our voting analogy, contingency modelling admittedly appears nonsensical. In addition to the undecideds, one would now also consider those who decide in favour of not only one candidate but also simultaneously for one or the other opposition candidates. This, finally, reduces the election to absurdity. Against the background of decisions regarding politically motivated violence and those who commit it, it can nevertheless make sense to consider those who feel terrified and liberated at the same time. When, for example, Nicolae Ceaușescu, the neo-Stalinist dictator of Romania, and his wife, Elena, were sentenced to death by a military court and summarily shot by Ionel Boero and two of his men on 25 December 1989, Romania was at civil war.³¹ While units of the Romanian army and the state police were quelling riots and demonstrations by shooting at the people, parts of the army had already sided with the incensed populace. Only with the execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu did the regular troops and state police at last switch sides to join the people. The regime changed, and the civil war ended. Thus the execution of Ceaușescu definitively led to the liberation of the Romanian people from Ceaușescu and his oppressive neo-Stalinist regime, as well as to the abrupt end of the civil war. However, this was simultaneously accompanied by horror at the execution itself: a majority of people, and perhaps even the general public, in Romania and in the Western world felt *liberated* by the politically motivated act of violence, the shooting of the Ceaușescus; however, they were at the same time *not also not terrified* by the act.

We are dealing, therefore, with a state of affairs that would be excluded under a contrary modelling, but which nonetheless existed. Even 25 years later, Western observers are scarcely able to look upon the Ceaușescu shooting and the “executioners” without dismay – for example when one hears Ionel Boero recount in an interview: “There were

three of us and we shot from the hip, from a distance of about seven metres. Each of us had 30 bullets, so 90 bullets in total"; or when Boero speaks of Elena Ceaușescu: "She stank like a beggar-woman and had seemingly soiled her pants out of fear. During the court martial I had to admonish her several times to calm down. I put my hand on her thigh and told her to stop behaving like a gypsy."³²

While it may be quite useful to allow for simultaneous liberation and terror qua modelling, this becomes questionable as soon as one undertakes to quantify those terrified and liberated, so on the level of classifying freedom fighters/heroes or terrorists/amok-runners. Within the proto-definitions of *majorities* of terrified or liberated, concepts of terrorists, freedom fighters, amok-runners and heroes would emerge which would define a committer of violence simultaneously as a terrorist and freedom fighter, even simultaneously as a hero and madman running amok. However, this is not only a problem peculiar to the underlying proto-definitions. Such a definition of politically motivated committers of violence, which is based on a contingency modelling, ultimately contradicts every (conventional) understanding of freedom fighter and hero – i.e., certainly not as something that is at the same time also a terrorist and amok-runner – and vice versa. Instead, the one group is differentiated from the other, and it is precisely upon this distinction that the proto-definition is genetically constructed.

All this seems to argue emphatically against a contingency modelling of "to terrify" and "to liberate". On the basis of contingency modelling, one could, for example, no longer ascribe to Breivik a contradiction or, as such, insanity, when he declares he is a liberator and terrifier at the same time, and that he is, from his perspective, a hero, while from ours he is a madman. Nevertheless, Breivik, as an all-terrifying amok-runner and a non-liberating "liberator", would remain a madman.

5. Evaluation

While it is quite apparent that no ideal modelling exists, we can, by again comparing the three modelling experiments, identify one modelling as the most adequate: contradictory modelling, in contrast to the other two, does not make possible an explication of the fictionality of the heroic concept – in the context of politically motivated violence. Other heroes, such as those in sports or, as is common in "real existing socialism", "heroes of labour", are not dealt with here. Not only can these exist; in fact, they did and do exist in great numbers.

In addition, contradictory modelling compels from the outset a decision about committers of politically motivated violence as either terrorists or freedom fighters, while both contrary and contingent relations leave room for indeterminacy and scepticism between “to terrify” and “to liberate”. And yet what neither a contrary nor a contradictory relation can capture is the potential of a liberating blow to be terrifying. This only becomes possible with a contingency modelling. However – and this is at first glance a clear argument against it – this modelling results in completely counterintuitive and, if you will, counter-conventional concepts of terrorists, freedom fighters, amok-runners and heroes of politically motivated violence. And yet, since a contingency modelling – in contrast to a contradictory modelling – shares the advantages of contrary modelling, it is worthwhile concluding by again considering both of these from a comparative perspective.

In doing so, it becomes evident that a contingency modelling seems useful at the level of individual decisions on being terrified and liberated. On the other hand, a contrary modelling seems necessary at the level of majority decisions and thus for the classification of politically motivated violence and those who commit it as terrorists/amok-runners or freedom fighters/heroes. Nonetheless, the advantages of both modellings can also be realised by a contingency modelling with an additional condition, namely that the majority cannot at the same time be liberated and terrified, or formally $\mathbf{W}(y) \neg[E(y,x,z) \wedge B(y,x,z)]$.

On closer inspection, though, the additional condition is nothing more than a relationship that was already implicitly given in contradictory and contrary modellings of “to terrify” and “to liberate”. As such, the following applies: $\forall(y) [E(y,x,z) \rightarrow \neg B(y,x,z)] \rightarrow \neg \mathbf{W}(y) [E(y,x,z) \wedge B(y,x,z)]$.³³ By applying this additional condition to our original example, Breivik, as someone who simultaneously terrifies and liberates, would continue to be not necessarily insane. Breivik would, however, as someone who simultaneously terrifies and liberates *the majority*, hence as hero and amok-runner, be contradictory and therefore be once again potentially insane. Furthermore, as an amok-runner and a “liberator” who liberates no one, he remains a madman.

While a conditional contingency modelling can, on the basis of a comparison of the modelling approaches, be identified as the most adequate modelling, the modelling experiments demonstrated above and their simultaneous self-reflexive analysis harbour yet another, completely different potential. The real potential of such a formal discourse analysis lies not in the determination and construction of concepts of politically motivated violence and those who commit it, but in the

criticism and deconstruction of discourses about politically motivated violence that can be found particularly in the mass media as an articulation, but also as a propagandistic steering, of public opinion.³⁴ To this end, formal discourse analysis enables us not only to critically scrutinise existing concepts in their arbitrariness and conventionality, as discursive axioms or *dispositifs*.³⁵ In the framework of such a method, actual discourses (as systems of concepts) can now be critically assessed in their intrinsic consistency and ultimately in their justification – particularly, but not only, discourses of politically motivated violence. Owing to the performative force that discourses about politically motivated violence can and usually do generate in the public discourse, an analysis and criticism of such terms and the positing of terms is not only highly useful or valuable but also, if the public discourse is to remain self-aware, ultimately unavoidable.

Notes

1. For more on Breivik's manifesto, see BBC (24 July 2011) "'Breivik Manifesto' Details Chilling Attack Preparation", BBC, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14267007>.
2. B. Schulz and S. Utler (16 April 2012) "Breivik beruft sich auf Notwehr", *Spiegel Online*, <http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/staatsanwaeltzeichnen-anders-breiviks-weg-zum-attentaeter-nach-a-827757.html>.
3. Focus Online (17 April 2012) "Prozess gegen Massenmörder in Oslo: Die krude Gedankenwelt des Anders Behring Breivik", *Focus Online*, http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/terror-in-norwegen/prozess-gegen-massenmoerder-in-oslo-die-krude-gedankenwelt-des-anders-behring-breivik_aid_738917.html. This and all following quotations have been translated from German.
4. G. Traufetter and E. A. Eik (22 June 2012) "Plädoyer im Massenmörder-Prozess: Verteidiger fordert Freispruch für Breivik", *Spiegel Online*, <http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/massenmoerder-breivik-verteidigung-fordert-im-prozess-freispruch-a-840313.html>.
5. S. Krause, D. Seher and S. Klatt (25 July 2011) "Der Massenmord in Norwegen Aufruf eines 'Tempelritters'", *WAZ Online*, <http://www.derwesten.de/politik/aufruf-eines-tempelritters-id4907368.html>; B. Menke (17 April 2012) "Gerichtspsychiater: 'Es ist besser, man lässt Breivik ausreden'", *Spiegel Online*, <http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/attentaeter-anders-breivik-lobt-al-qaida-vor-gericht-a-828140.html>; K. Haimerl (25 July 2011) "Abgründe des Abendlandes", *sueddeutsche.de*, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/norwegen-das-manifest-des-anders-behring-breivik-abgruende-des-abendlandes-1.1124360>.
6. In the following, "amok-runner" is preferred to more colloquially common English terms, such as "spree killer" or "rampage killer", both for the sake of terminological consistency and due to its proximity to the German term "Amokläufer", which in its etymology and widespread usage in the media forms the basis of the present deliberations.

7. As a preliminary study to the present article, please see Christer Petersen (2015) *Terror und Propaganda: Prolegomena zu einer Analytischen Medienwissenschaft* (Bielefeld: Transcript).
8. Rendered in full: "Someone (x) is a terrorist (T), if and only if he is a terrorist", whereby "if and only if" represents in normal language the equivalence operator (\leftrightarrow). See, for example, Irving M. Copi (1982) *Introduction to Logic*, 6th edn (New York: Macmillan), p. 315.
9. For the etymology of the term see, for example, Renate Hau (1986) *Globalwörterbuch Lateinisch-Deutsch* (Stuttgart: Klett), pp. 1035–1036, or Gerhardt Köbler (1995) *Deutsches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, www.koeblergerhard.de/derwbhin.html.
10. One can apply here George Berkeley's "esse est percipi", albeit not in general, but rather with respect to being "terrified" or "liberated" and the perception or feeling of being "terrified" or "liberated". See George Berkeley (2002) *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, David R. Wilkins (ed.), <http://www.maths.tcd.ie/~dwilkins/Berkeley/HumanKnowledge/1734/HumKno.pdf>.
11. Violence does not, however, have to be formally considered, as the definitions of freedom fighter and terrorist are explicitly situated in the context of politically motivated violence.
12. The reference group of evaluators is fundamentally always defined variably with the group of those affected by political violence. One must question, on a case-by-case basis, the plausibility of the underlying reference group of y and in doing so identify the respective group of those affected, hence the evaluators.
13. $F(x,z) =_{df}$ (is defined as) "x is a freedom fighter and z is a liberating blow"; $E(y,x,z) =_{df}$ "y feels terrified by x and z".
14. $W(x)$ quantifies the number of all evaluators with regard to the majority (W from the Polish *Większość*). The majority is understood here as 50 per cent plus one individual, up to 100 per cent. The minority (K , from the Hungarian *Kisebbség*) is, by contrast, understood as the range between 0 and 50 per cent, symbolised by $K(x)$. For the relation between majority and minority, it follows from this that: (1) If the property μ applies for the majority, then the property $\neg\mu$ applies for the minority, in symbols: $W(x) \mu(x) \rightarrow K(x) \neg\mu(x)$; (2) If the property μ applies for the majority, then the property μ does *not* apply for the minority, in symbols: $W(x) \mu(x) \rightarrow \neg K(x) \mu(x)$; and (3) If the property μ does *not* apply for the majority, then the property μ applies for the minority, in symbols: $\neg W(x) \mu(x) \rightarrow K(x) \mu(x)$. Accordingly, a contrary relation exists between $W(y) \mu(y)$ and $W(y) \neg\mu(x)$ and a subcontrary relation exists between $K(x) \mu(x)$ and $K(x) \neg\mu(x)$.
15. Formally, $\forall(x) \mu(x) \rightarrow W(x) \mu(x)$ applies. "All" also always implies the majority, so that the majority, in turn, may not formally imply "all", but also does not preclude it. Precisely this circumstance renders "all" a special case of the majority.
16. It is of no consequence that "almost" is not formally represented here by means of the universal quantifier, as this has no influence on the metalinguistically described object range; at the same time, this allows for modelling by means of predicate logic.
17. $H(x,z) =_{df}$ "x is a hero and z is a heroic deed."

18. $A(x,z) =_{df}$ "x is an amok-runner and z is a rampage."
19. Liselotte Kramer-Kaske (1980) *Illustrierte historische Hefte 21: Die kubanische Volksrevolution 1953–1962: Herausgegeben vom Zentralinstitut für Geschichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR* (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften), p. 36.
20. The universal quantifier (\forall) serves to generalise, that is to say, to universally quantify, the statements. $\forall(y) [B(y,x,z) \leftrightarrow \neg E(y,x,z)]$ would therefore read in full: "It applies for *all* evaluators that they are liberated by the committer of violence/the act of violence, if and only if they do not feel terrified by the committer of violence/the act of violence."
21. Cited in the documentary *Die RAF, Teil 1: Der Krieg der Bürgerkinder*, first broadcast on 9 October 2007 on ARD.
22. Within the context of a different discursive framing, the following could prove productive for amok-runners in general. Here, though, we are only concerned with politically motivated acts of violence and those who commit them.
23. As such, the implicit relationship between terrorist and amok-runner was apparently not only a contrary one but also a contradictory one.
24. A relation of implication, $p \rightarrow q$, differs from a relation of equivalence, $p \leftrightarrow q$, precisely in that the following only applies for the latter: $(p \leftrightarrow q) \leftrightarrow (p \rightarrow q) \wedge (q \rightarrow p)$; if two statements p and q are equivalent, then p implies q and, simultaneously, q implies p.
25. Owing to the above definition of majority and minority, there exists even with contradictory modelling the (rare) possibility that neither a majority of terrified nor a majority of non-terrified emerges. This is precisely the case when the number of terrified is exactly equal to the number of non-terrified (50 per cent terrified and 50 per cent non-terrified). In this case, both the terrified and the non-terrified are in the minority (sub-contrary relation of $K(y) E(y,x,z)$ and $K(y) \neg E(y,x,z)$). This may initially seem counter-intuitive, but if one again enlists the election analogy, namely with regard to the distribution of seats in a parliament, it becomes clear that this circumstance is entirely possible. However, with sufficiently large numbers of deciders (in terms not of parliamentarians, but rather of voters), such a state of affairs can be regarded as a negligible outlier: with an increasing number of deciders, the probability of a stalemate declines.
26. By deciding in favour of a contrary modelling of "to terrify" and "to liberate" and the accompanying possibility (M) of a sceptical position, $M\{\exists(y) [\neg E(y,x,z) \wedge \neg B(y,x,z)]\}$, one has automatically decided against a subcontrary modelling of "to terrify" and "to liberate". This would require that one necessarily (N) feels terrified or liberated by any given violent act, $N\{\forall(y) [E(y,x,z) \vee B(y,x,z)]\}$. Conversely, a decision in favour of a subcontrary modelling is one against contrary modelling and, as such, against scepticism: $N\{\forall(y) [E(y,x,z) \vee B(y,x,z)]\} \leftrightarrow \neg M\{\exists(y) [\neg E(y,x,z) \wedge \neg B(y,x,z)]\}$. Analogously, a decision in favour of a contradictory modelling of "to terrify" and "to liberate" as described further above is automatically a decision against both subaltern modellings and thus against a (conceptually impossible) equivalence of "to terrify" and "to liberate".
27. Jurij M. Lotman (1972) *Die Struktur literarischer Texte* (Munich: Fink); also exhaustively and on the basis of formal logic in Peter Klimczak and

- Christer Petersen (2015) "Ordnung und Abweichung. Jurij M. Lotmans Grenzüberschreitungstheorie aus modallogischer Perspektive", *Journal of Literary Theory*, 9(1), 134–158, and Peter Klimczak (2015) *Formale Subtextanalyse: Modallogische Grundlegung der Grenzüberschreitungstheorie Jurij M. Lotmans* (Münster: Mentis).
28. Hans Krahl (2006) *Einführung in die Literaturwissenschaft/Textanalyse* (Kiel: Ludwig), p. 310.
 29. For example, in a *Spiegel* interview about Breivik with the Austrian forensic psychiatrist Reinhard Haller, one could read the following: *Spiegel Online*: "Where does the difference lie between fanaticism and delusion?" *Haller*: "In the case of fanaticism, the ideas still bear a trace of reality. What the fanatic thinks and says could still be valid in some way. But when one claims to be the King of Norway and the liberator of mankind, the above does not apply." Again, see Menke, 2012.
 30. P. Hinrichs "Breivik: 'Ich weiß, dass es grausam war'", *Abendblatt.de*, <http://www.abendblatt.de/politik/ausland/article2250276/Breivik-Ich-weiss-dass-es-grausam-war.html>, date accessed 25 November 2014.
 31. M. Schepp (20 October 2005) "Ceausescu Scharfrichter: Der Diktator und sein Henker", *Stern.de*, <http://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/ceausescu-scharfrichter-der-diktator-und-sein-henker-547930.html>.
 32. Again, see Schepp, 2005.
 33. In particular, the following applies: $\forall(y) [E(y,x,z) \rightarrow \neg B(y,x,z)] \rightarrow_{[1]} W(y) [E(y,x,z) \rightarrow \neg B(y,x,z)] \rightarrow_{[2]} W(y) [\neg E(y,x,z) \vee \neg B(y,x,z)] \rightarrow_{[3]} W(y) \neg[E(y,x,z) \wedge B(y,x,z)]$. It follows from the contrary relation of "to terrify" and "to liberate" – i.e. from the circumstance – that all who are terrified are not liberated (1) that the same relation between "to terrify" and "to liberate" is valid also for the majority, as "all" implies the majority. In turn, it follows from this, using the inference rules of material implication (2) and De Morgan's laws (3), that the majority cannot simultaneously be terrified and liberated.
 34. For more on the method of formal discourse analysis in the context of a new discipline of Analytic Media Studies, see again Petersen (2015).
 35. An axiom is understood here to mean a determination or definition that is presupposed without any further reason or justification. As such, the term axiom is quite close to the Foucauldian term *dispositif*, but with at least the one distinction that axioms refer more to conscious/intentional positings, while *dispositifs* signify the assumptions in certain cultural discourses that are not or no longer questioned or perceived as positings. For more on the terms *dispositif* and "discourse", see, for example, Andrea Bührmann/Werner Schneider (2008) *Vom Diskurs zum Dispositiv: Eine Einführung in die Dispositivanalyse* (Bielefeld: Transcript), pp. 23–55.